Some machines also create a paper ballot, which would make them similar to the BMD group- if they work properly. This is obviously a complete security disaster. These are bad- really bad- but at least they aren’t…ĭirect recording electronic systems (DRE) record votes directly on the machine itself. Because they create a ballot that then has to be scanned, scanner attacks from the previous section are also still in play. The defense to BMD attacks is simply to not use them, or at worst for only the physically impaired to use them. President), attacks to change the overall margin by 1-2% are close to undetectable under optimistic assumptions and possibly even 5% or more under real-world conditions. They’re brutally vulnerable for down-ballot races, and even for the top race (e.g. Quoting from the paper, “half of voters don’t look at their ballot printout at all, and those who do look for an average of 4 seconds”. While useful for the small number of physically impaired voters, as the paper above notes, in practice it’s difficult to make sure that they’re working properly on election day. The robustness of various recount schemes will be discussed in the state-by-state section later.īallot-marking devices are extremely expensive pencils that fill out a ballot that a scanner then reads. While the video above is correct that the scanning machine is vulnerable to attacks, the defense to these attacks is the ability to hand-count ballots, and having a candidate-funded recount always available by law is the ultimate backstop against scanner attacks. The hand-marked paper ballot, generally read by an optical scanning machine. There are three major types of voting equipment in use. Links to recount statutes were mostly found on Ballotpedia. This post would not be possible without the resources at Verified Voting, and unless sourced otherwise, information about voting methods in use are from there. Compromising the list of eligible voters, engaging in a variety of forms of voter suppression, and packed courts simply refusing to accept the results even after a recount are also dangers, but they’re beyond the scope of this post. This post only covers threats that result in the final vote count not reflecting the votes that were cast. BMDs and other voting machines are technologies that have absolutely no reason to exist for the general population, but thanks to ignorance and good old-fashioned corruption, we’ve given corporate handouts of hundreds of millions of dollars in return for machines that are worse than worthless and compromise the very ability of a fair and verifiable election to exist in many jurisdictions. This blog is in complete agreement with the paper that the only legitimate use for ballot-marking devices is for those who are physically incapable of hand-marking a paper ballot by themselves, but still doesn’t consider them a necessity for that purpose (states can have voter-assistance protocols and only use hand marked paper ballots). As an introduction to election security issues, I highly recommend watching why electronic voting is a bad idea (short and entertaining, trust me), and if you want a more academic take, this recent paper discusses the issues with ballot-marking devices (BMD). TL DR Democrats can’t win the presidency in 2020 without flipping deep red (R+15 or more in 2016) states or at least one, and probably two states that Rs won in 2016 that have multiple severe election security vulnerabilities.Įlection security has been a hot-button topic lately, but I have yet to see any articles about how much these vulnerabilities allow the 2020 election to be manipulated.
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